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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4360

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS (BY POUCH)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 6 USNATO 5933

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, NAC, XB, XP

SUBJ: REINFORCED NAC ON THE FAR EAST, OCTOBER 29, 1975

SUMMARY: NAC CONSULTATION ON FAR EAST ON OCTOBER 29 WAS REINFORCED BY SENIOR POLICY OFFICIALS FROM BELGIUM, FRG, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, UK AND US. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE HABIB (US) LED OFF DISCUSSION, COVERING GENERAL EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIX MONTHS SINCE THE FALL OF SAIGON. HE SAID THE INITIAL APPREHENSION FOLLOWING THE FALL OF SAIGON HAD DISSIPATED. THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES ARE STILL CONCERNED WITH THE IMPACT OF HANOI'S SUCCESS ON THEIR SECURITY; THEY ARE MOVING CLOSER TO THE NON-ALIGNED BLOC AND BEGINNING TO DEVELOP ASEAN INTO A MORE MEANINGFUL REGIONAL ORGANIZATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY CONTINUE TO RELY UPON THE US COMMITMENT, WHICH WE HAVE REAFFIRMED. PRC RELATIONS WITH THE US AND JAPAN ARE RELATIVELY GOOD, WHILE THOSE WITH THE SOVIETS ARE COOL. THE INTERNAL SCENE IN CHINA IS STABLE; THE LINES OF SUCCESSION ARE SET WITH THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP DISPLAYING A COLLEGIAL CHARACTER. JAPAN-US RELATIONS ARE THE BEST THEY HAVE EVER BEEN. JAPAN IS CLOSER TO PEKING THAN TO MOSCOW. CONFIDENTIAL

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THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA REMAINS CALM FOR THE TIME BEING, BUT PRESENTS THE GREATEST DANGER FOR POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION. HABIB'S PRESENTATION WAS FOLLOWED BY A WIDERANGING DISCUSSION INVOLVING PERMREPS AND VISITING OFFICIALS

FROM CAPITALS.

THIS REINFORCED NAC ON THE FAR EAST WAS GREETED WITH ENTHUSIASM BY PERMREPS. MENZIES (CANADA) WELCOMED THE CONSULTATIONS AS "USEFUL AND TIMELY" AND PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF PARTICIPATION BY HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS. SIMILAR APPRECIATION WAS EXPRESSED BY KRAPF (FRG). CATALANO (ITALY) SAID THE SESSION WAS ONE OF THE BEST ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS HE COULD REMEMBER AND THAT MEETINGS OF THIS SORT SHOULD BE AMONG THE BEST TRADITIONS OF NATO. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL PANSA SUMMED UP THE MEETING, CALLING IT "EXTREMELY GOOD", PROVIDING EVIDENCE OF THE ALLIES PUTTING INTO PRACTICE THEIR RESOLVE WITH REGARD TO CONSULTATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN PARA 11 OF THE OTTAWA DECLARATION. COMMENT: WE CONSIDER REINFORCED NAC ON THE FAR EAST TO HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL IN ENHANCING THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN THE ALLIANCE AND ALSO IN PROVIDING OUR 14 NATO ALLIES WITH A LUCID AND FORCEFUL EXPOSE OF US POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES IN THIS HIGHLY IMPORTANT REGION OF THE WORLD. END SUMMARY.

1. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL PANSA OPENED REINFORCED NAC OF OCTOBER 29 BY WELCOMING ATTENDANCE OF HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM BELGIUM (AMBASSADOR WENDELEN), FRG (ASSISTANT SECRETARY LAHN), ITALY (MINISTER SALIMEI), NETHERLANDS (FE AFFAIRS DIRECTOR ROOKMAKER), UK (ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY MALD) AND US (ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB). PANSA SAID THIS MEETING WOULD FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITHIN THE COUNCIL.

2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB (US) SAID THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF APPREHENSION IN ASIA AFTER THE FALL OF SAIGON. GENERALLY SPEAKING, SUCH APPREHENSION HAS ABATED. THE MAJOR POWER BALANCE IN EAST ASIA REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SEVERAL NEW PRESSURE POINTS. THE REACTION OF THE REGION TO EVENTS IN INDOCHINA HAS BEEN MEASURED AND TEMPERATE. COUNTRIES ARE MOTIVATED BY NATIONALISTIC ASPIRATIONS AND ARE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THEY ARE EVOLVING THEIR OWN POLICIES AND HAVE DEVELOPED A CONFIDENTIAL

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BETTER APPRECIATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SELF-RELIANCE AS A FACTOR IN SECURITY MATTERS. HE SAID THERE IS GENERAL DESIRE FOR CLOSER IDENTIFICATION WITH THE NON-ALIGNED BLOC. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN NON-COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA; SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES WERE MEMBERS OF NON-ALIGNED IN THE PAST AND THEY HAVE BROUGHT OTHERS ALONG. THERE IS A WIDE-SPREAD REGIONAL VIEW THAT CONTINUED US PRESENCE AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA IS BENEFICIAL FOR ASIA.

3. HABIB DESCRIBED US REACTION TO THE INDOCHINA AFTERMATH AS NOT SUBSTANTIAL. A DIVISIVE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE HAS BEEN REMOVED. US INTENDS TO MAINTAIN MORE NORMAL INTERESTS IN ASIA. THIS WILL INCLUDE CONTINUED FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF

US FORCES IN ASIA INCLUDING SUBSIDIARY DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
IN KOREA AND THAILAND, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER DEPLOYMENT WILL
END NEXT YEAR.

4. HABIB SAW CERTAIN RESTRAINTS ON MAJOR POWERS -- CHINA,
SOVIET UNION, JAPAN AND US -- AFTER THE FALL OF INDOCHINA.
ALL MAJOR POWERS RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES,
NO ONE POWER CAN ESTABLISH HEGEMONY IN THE AREA. THE OVER-
RIDING CHINESE PREOCCUPATION IS THREAT OF SOVIET HEGEMONY
IN ASIA. ALL MAJOR POWERS RECOGNIZE THAT IN THIS PERIOD,
IT IS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST TO ACT WITH MODERATION AND
RESTRAINT. THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY, THE US-JAPANESE ALLIANCE,
US AND JAPANESE ECONOMIC PREDOMINANCE IN ASIA, AND LIMITED
SOVIET ENTREE TO ASIAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS GENERALLY
CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY. THESE FACTORS ARE NOT LIKELY TO
CHANGE SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE SHORT TERM, AND PROBABLY NOT
OVER THE MEDIUM TERM AS WELL. EQUILIBRIUM COULD BE CHANGED
SIGNIFICANTLY IF THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY WERE DRASTICALLY
ALTERED OR IF RUSSIA ATTAINED MAJOR INFLUENCE IN ASIA, BUT
NEITHER APPEARS A LIKELY PROSPECT.

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5. SMALLER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, CAN
EXERCISE GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND MANEUVERABILITY IN SEEKING
NEW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES. THEY SEE USEFULNESS IN REGIONAL
GROUPINGS SUCH AS ASEAN. THERE WILL PROBABLY BE AN ASEAN
SUMMIT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. ASEAN IS BEGINNING TO GO
BEYOND GENERALITIES, INCLUDING PLANNING EXPANDED COORDIN-
ATION OF SECURITY EFFORTS. ASEAN IS SEEKING BETTER UNDER-
STANDING AND REALTIONS WITH COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS AND IS PAR-

TICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT HANOI AS A SUB-REGIONAL POWER. THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THAILAND, WHICH IS REGARDED AS SICK MAN OF ASIA. TWO COUNTRIES, THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND, MOVED QUICKLY TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. ASEAN IS CONCERNED WITH THE IMPACT OF HANOI'S SUCCESS ON THEIR DOMESTIC INSURGENTS' MOVEMENTS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF INSURGENT GROUPS IN BURMA. THREE DIFFERENT AREAS IN THAILAND ARE THREATENED. INSURGENTS IN MALAYSIA HAVE RECENTLY BECOME MORE ACTIVE. THERE ARE TWO SUCH MOVEMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, ONE MOSLEM AND ONE COMMUNIST. THERE IS ALSO AN INCIPIENT MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA, SEPARATE FROM THE PROBLEM OF TIMOR.

6. HABIB SAID US-PRC RELATIONS ARE GOOD ALTHOUGH THEY ARE CONFIDENTIAL

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NOT YET FULLY NORMALIZED. THE PRC SEES US AS A COUNTER-BALANCE AGAINST MOSCOW. THIS INTEREST IS STRONGER NOW THAN AT THE BEGINNING OF US-PRC RELATIONSHIP. PEKING IS UNHAPPY WITH DETENTE, AND MAKES ITS DISPLEASURE KNOWN AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY BY EMPHASIZING THE DANGERS OF DETENTE. THE PRC CONTINUES TO HARP ON THEME THAT SOVIETS ARE FEINTING IN THE EAST WHILE PREPARING TO STRIKE IN THE WEST. THEY CANNOT SEE THAT THIS IS IRRELEVANT. THE PRC SEES US MILITARY PRESENCE ABROAD, IN BOTH EUROPE AND ASIA, AS A NECESSARY COUNTERWEIGHT TO SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. TAIWAN IS STILL THE MAIN OBSTACLE PREVENTING FULL NORMALIZATION OF US-PRC RELATIONS. THE PRC'S INSISTENCE ON THREE POINTS REGARDING TAIWAN -- ABROGATION OF THE US-ROC DEFENSE TREATY, WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES AND BREAKING US-ROC RELATIONS -- ARE UNCHANGED. THE PRC IS NOT, HOWEVER, PRESSING ON THIS ISSUE. PRESIDENT FORD WILL VISIT PEKING WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, BUT THIS TRIP WILL INVOLVE MORE POLITICAL SYMBOLISM THAN CONCRETE RESULTS.

7. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS REMAIN COOL. BORDER DISCUSSIONS ARE IN A RECESS AND TRADE IS STAGNATING, WHILE THE RHETORICAL BATTLE HAS GROWN SHARPER. PEKING SAYS MOSCOW IS THE CHIEF THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY. THE SOVIETS AND PRC COMPETE IN HANOI, PYONGYANG, TOKYO AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

8. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS ARE RELATIVELY GOOD. THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO INSIST ON THEIR ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE IN ANY PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN. ALTHOUGH THIS WILL DELAY SIGNING OF A TREATY, ONE WILL, IN THE END, BE SIGNED. THE PRC BACKS JAPAN AGAINST MOSCOW ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE. THE PRC IS FOND OF SAYING, INCLUDING TO JAPANESE VISITORS, THAT US-JAPANESE RELATIONS ARE MORE IMPORTANT AT THIS TIME THAN JAPANESE-PRC RELATIONS. TOKYO'S RELATIONS ARE BETTER WITH PEKING THAN WITH MOSCOW.

9. HABIB CHARACTERIZED THE INTERNAL SCENE IN CHINA AS STRESSING POLITICAL STABILITY, UNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CHOU EN-LAI IS ILL, AND FOR THIS REASON COULD NOT SEE SECRETARY

KISSINGER. MAO TSE-TUNG IS STILL ACTIVELY CONCERNED WITH OVERALL POLICY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ESPECIALLY RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW. TENG HSIAO-P'ING IS SEEMINGLY IN CONFIDENT CONTROL. THERE IS A COLLEGIAL CHARACTER TO CURRENT PRC LEADERSHIP. CONFIDENTIAL

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REHABILITATION OF SOME OF THOSE PURGED DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION INDICATES MOVEMENT TOWARD MAINTAINING THE BALANCE WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP. THE SHUI HU CAMPAIGN HAS APPARENTLY ENDED, REPLACED BY A CAMPAIGN TO INCREASE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY. ANOTHER IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN APPEARS TO BE IN THE OFFERING. THE LINES OF SUCCESSION APPEAR TO BE SET, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE SUCCESSION WILL PERPETRATE COLLEGIAL LEADERSHIP.

10. HABIB SAID JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH THE US ARE THE BEST THEY HAVE EVER BEEN. EFFECTS OF THE NIXON SHOCKS ARE CLEARLY PAST. THE EMPEROR'S VISIT TO THE US WAS SYMBOLIC OF EXCELLENT, CLOSE BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE DO NOT HAVE PROBLEMS WITH JAPAN IN THE OLD SENSE OF THE WORD. WE COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH JAPAN ON ALL MATTERS, INCLUDING DEFENSE. WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE TO THE PACE SET BY JAPAN, AND WE ARE NOT PRESSING JAPAN TO EXPAND ITS DEFENSE FORCES SIGNIFICANTLY. WE BELIEVE CONSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL AND BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS WILL PROVIDE APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS.

11. JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE NOT ALL THAT WARM. THERE IS A JAPANESE TILT TOWARD CHINA. SOVIET PRESSURE TACTICS REGARDING THE PRC HEGEMONY CLAUSE IN A FUTURE PEACE TREATY AND A HARDENED SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES HAVE COOLED TOKYO-MOSCOW RELATIONS. JOINT ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES WITH THE SOVIETS ARE MOVING SLOWLY.

12. TOKYO IS KEENLY ATTUNED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA, PARTICULARLY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH THE ROK HAVE IMPROVED. JAPAN IS ALSO SEEKING TO DEFUSE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA BY TRYING TO DRAW NORTH KOREA INTO MORE REASONABLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ROK AND EVEN WITH THE US. JAPAN'S INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS PRIMARILY ECONOMIC. JAPAN ADJUSTED RELATIONS WITH HANOI QUICKLY. THEY HAVE AN EMBASSY IN HANOI AND WILL PROVIDE US\$45 MILLION IN AID TO THE DRV OVER NEXT TWO YEARS. JAPAN SEES ITSELF AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN HANOI AND THE US.

13. HABIB SAW THE NATURAL DIVERSITY OF THE REGION AS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE POWER EQUILIBRIUM. OUR PREOCCUPATION, AND THAT OF OTHERS, WITH INDOCHINA IS FINISHED. WHEN WE CONFIDENTIAL

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PREOCCUPIED HANOI'S ATTENTION THERE WAS LITTLE CONCERN IN

ASEAN. NOW THAT THIS PERIOD IS FINISHED, IT HAS CREATED PROBLEMS FOR ASEAN. THE COUNTRIES OF THIS REGION SEE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY GOING HAND IN HAND. THEY SEE THEIR DEPENDENCE UPON A US COMMITMENT AND ARE CONCERNED WHETHER WE WILL FULFILL THAT COMMITMENT. WE HAVE TRIED TO REASSURE THESE COUNTRIES OF THE CONSTANCY AND CHARACTER OF OUR COMMITMENT. THEREFORE WE HAVE NOT WITHDRAWN ANY OF OUR FORCES PRECIPITOUSLY, EVEN FROM THAILAND. THE DIVERSITY OF THE REGION, FORCES OF NATIONALISM, AND THE FAR-RANGING NATURE OF SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY ARE FACTORS WHICH MAINTAIN THE EQUILIBRIUM OF POWER IN ASIA. THESE PUT A PREMIUM ON FLEXIBILITY AND ON THE NEED TO WORK TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND CONFRONTATIONS. THIS EQUILIBRIUM OF THE POWER DYNAMIC MAY NOT PREVAIL, BUT IT WIDENS THE OPPORTUNITY TO AVOID CONFRONTATION.

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14. DR. ROOKMAKER (NETHERLANDS EXPERT) DISCUSSED THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN COUNTRIES' POLICIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN APPROACH TO THE AREA. HE EMPHASIZED THAT SINCE THE END OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THEY CANNOT FIGHT COMMUNISM WITH WEAPONS AND MUST CONCENTRATE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARTICULARLY FOR THE POORER SECTORS OF THEIR SOCIETIES. HE SAID ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE ADOPTED A CONSTRUCTIVE POLICY TOWARD INDOCHINA AND HOPE EVENTUALLY THAT THEIR OWN CONCEPT OF NEUTRALISM CAN BE EXTENDED TO EMBRACE INDOCHINA. HE BELIEVED WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD TAKE ASEAN ASPIRATIONS INTO ACCOUNT AND SHOULD NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST INDOCHINA IN A WAY WHICH WOULD INHIBIT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ASEAN'S OBJECTIVES. FOR EXAMPLE, COOPERATION BETWEEN ASEAN AND INDOCHINA

WOULD BE FACILITATED IF WESTERN AID TO THE AREA WAS NOT DIRECTED EXCLUSIVELY TO ASEAN COUNTRIES.

15. ERALP (TURKEY) ASKED HABIB TO COMMENT ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMBODIA AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF CAMBODIA TO HANOI, CHINA, AND THE USSR. HABIB RECALLED THAT WHEN PHNOM PENH FELL, THE KHMER ROUGE EMPTIED PHNOM PENH AS WELL AS OTHER CAMBODIAN CITIES AND ELIMINATED ALL OFFICIALS OF ANY STATURE. CONFIDENTIAL

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THE YOUNG AND THE OLD SUFFERED MOST IN THIS OPERATION, DURING WHICH THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE LOST THEIR LIVES. THE KHMER ROUGE APPARENTLY WANTED TO BREAK DOWN THE EXISTING URBAN STRUCTURE WHICH HAD CONTROLLED THE COUNTRY UNDER SIHANOUK AND TO RULE THROUGH THE PARTY STRUCTURE OF THE KHMER ROUGE. THIS STRUCTURE REMAINS SHADOWY AND IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHO IS ON TOP.

16. AS TO CAMBODIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS, HABIB NOTED EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING DISAGREEMENTS WITH HANOI. THERE HAD BEEN FIGHTING OVER OFF-SHORE ISLANDS AND ENGAGEMENTS IN BORDER AREAS. WHILE HANOI HAD WON THESE ENCOUNTERS, IT HAD NOT ALWAYS DONE SO EASILY AND IN SOME INSTANCES NEEDED TO EMPLOY ITS AIR FORCE. THERE WERE CONTACTS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS AIMED AT SETTling BORDER CONFLICTS, BUT THESE EFFORTS HAD NOT BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL. HABIB NOTED THAT THE PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL INFLUENCE IN CAMBODIA AT PRESENT IS PEKING. THE KHMER ROUGE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN SOVIET SUPPORT FOR LON NOL AND THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDED FROM CAMBODIA. IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE KHMER ROUGE APPARENTLY INTEND TO ALLOW ONLY THREE COUNTRIES, WHICH HELPED THEM DURING THEIR STRUGGLE, TO BE REPRESENTED IN PHNOM PENH; NORTH VIETNAM, CHINA, AND NORTH KOREA. HABIB OBSERVED THAT THE RIVALRY BETWEEN HANOI AND PEKING IN CAMBODIA IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. HOWEVER, ONE CAN ARGUE THAT PEKING LOOKS ON CAMBODIA AS A BUFFER STATE THAT COULD LIMIT HANOI'S SUBREGIONAL HEGEMONY, WHICH PEKING FEARS MIGHT SERVE AS A SURROGATE FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. HABIB CONCLUDED THAT OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THE KHMER ROUGE DO NOT INTEND TO PERMIT ANY WESTERN EMBASSIES IN CAMBODIA FOR SOME TIME. IT MAY BE A YEAR OR TWO BEFORE THE WEST BEGINS TO DEVELOP SOME INFLUENCE IN CAMBODIA.

17. BUSCH (NORWAY) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INDICATIONS OF CAMBODIAN POLICIES PICKED UP RECENTLY BY NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS: A CAMBODIAN IN CONTACT WITH SIHANOUK SAID THE PRINCE IS NEEDED AS A NATIONAL SYMBOL IN CAMBODIA BUT WOULD NOT BE GIVEN ANY INTERNAL POWER. SIHANOUK WOULD RETURN TO CAMBODIA AT THE END OF DECEMBER AND WOULD REMAIN THERE FOR SOME SIX MONTHS. AN EASTERN EUROPEAN CONTACT TOLD THE NORWEGIANS THE KHMER ROUGE INTEND TO PERMIT EIGHT ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH A CONFIDENTIAL

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DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA: ALGERIA, ALBANIA, ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, EGYPT, LAOS, MAURITANIA, AND SOUTH VIETNAM. SWEDEN MAY ACCREDIT A DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE TO CAMBODIA BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. THE KHMER ROUGE MAY BEGIN TO ADMIT CORRESPONDENTS INTO CAMBODIA BY THE BEGINNING OF 1976. BUSCH ALSO MENTIONED THAT NORWEGIAN CONTACTS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH ANY POSITIVE CONFIRMATION THAT NORTH VIETNAM IS PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THAI INSURGENTS THROUGH CAMBODIA.

18. ASSISTNAT UNDER-SECRETARY MALE (UK EXPERT) AGREED WITH HABIB'S PRESENTATION AND SAID THE UK APPROACHES THE REGION IN TERMS OF THE UK DESIRE FOR STABILITY IN THE AREA. HE NOTED THAT CHINESE-SOVIET COMPETITION HAS A DEFINITE EFFECT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ON THE BASIS OF BRITISH EXPERIENCE, HE CONFIRMED THAT THE CHINESE ARE EMPHASIZING THE DANGERS OF DETENTE TO WESTERN VISITORS. TENG HSIAO-PING MADE THIS CLEAR TO HEATH AS DID MAO IN EVEN STARKER TERMS. UK POLICY TOWARD CHINA AIMS TO DO WHAT IS POSSIBLE TO BRING CHINA INTO THE BROADER WORLD. UK RELATIONS WITH THE PRC ARE GOOD AS IS EVIDENCED BY THE LACK OF ANY UNCOMFORTABLE CHINESE INTERVENTIONS IN HONG KONG. BRITISH INTEREST TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE FOCUSES ON HONG KONG WHERE CHINA OBVIOUSLY COULD MAKE TROUBLE IF IT WISHED TO.

19. MALE SAID THE BRITISH REGARD THE CURRENT KOREAN SITUATION AS "SAFE", PARTICULARLY SINCE KIM IL-SONG WAS REBUFFED IN PEKING WHEN HE SOUGHT SUPPORT FOR A FORWARD POLICY AFTER THE FALL OF SAIGON. AS TO ASEAN, THE BRITISH REGARD THIS AS A LOCALLY GROWN ORGANIZATION AND THUS ONE WHICH HAS A GOOD INTERNATIONAL APPEARANCE. IT APPEARS TO BE AN ORGANIZATION WITH A LONG-TERM POTENTIAL, BUT WITHOUT IMMEDIATE EFFICACY. THE BRITISH ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE INSUGENCIES IN THAILAND AND MALAYSIA.

20. KILLICK (UK) NOTED WITH INTEREST HABIB'S REPORT THAT DURING THEIR VISIT TO PEKING, US OFFICIALS HAD TOLD THE CHINESE THAT IT WAS IRRELEVANT WHETHER THE USSR WAS, AS THE CHINESE MAINTAIN, FEINTING TO THE EAST WHILE ATTACKING TO THE WEST. KILLICK AGREED THAT THE CHINESE POSITION MIGHT BE IRRELEVANT IN A GEOPHYSICAL OR STRATEGIC SENSE. HOWEVER, CONFIDENTIAL

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HE BELIEVED THE US ATTITUDE WAS RELEVANT IN TERMS OF US SECURITY COMMITMENTS. HE ASKED WHETHER HE WAS CORRECT IN INTERPRETING THE US COMMENTS TO MEAN THAT THE US WOULD NOT STAND IDLY BY IF THE SOVIETS MOVED AGAINST THE EAST. HABIB SAID KILLICK WAS CORRECT. KILLICK'S ANALYSIS WAS PRESCIENT: THAT WAS PRECISLY WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER

MEANT TO CONVEY. THE US WOULD OPPOSE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HEGEMONY IN THE EAST OR IN THE WEST. HABIB EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS NOT FOR HIM TO SAY HOW THE US WOULD OPPOSE MOVES TOWARD HEGEMONY IN THE EAST. ANY SUCH MOVES WOULD NATURALLY RAISE SERIOUS ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE US GOVERNMENT.

21. SPEAKING TO MALE'S COMMENTS ON KOREA, HABIB SAID THE US GENERALLY AGREES THAT THE SITUATION IS CURRENTLY "SAFE" IN THAT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT HOSTILITIES MIGHT BREAK OUT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT KOREA IS ONE AREA IN EAST ASIA WHERE MISCALCULATION COULD LEAD TO CONFLICT INVOLVING THE MAJOR POWERS, INCLUDING THE US, WHICH CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN 40,000 TROOPS IN KOREA. HABIB AGREED, AS WELL, THAT THE CHINESE WITHHELD THE SUPPORT WHICH KIM SOUGHT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE END OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE UNITED STATES ALSO MADE IT CLEAR IN UNMISTAKEABLE TERMS THAT WE WOULD NOT PERMIT KIM TO CARRY OUT ADVENTURES IN SOUTH KOREA. WE BELIEVE KIM GOT THE MESSAGE.

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22. HABIB SAID NORTH KOREA'S CURRENT POLICY APPEARED AIMED AT A) WEAKENING THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF SOUTH KOREA, B) ACHIEVING US WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH KOREA, AND C) AWAITING INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS IN SOUTH KOREA WHICH NORTH KOREA COULD EXPLOIT. HABIB SAID THESE OBJECTIVES ARE REFLECTED IN NORTH KOREAN TACTICS AT THE UN WHICH ARE CLEARLY DIRECTED NOT ONLY AT BREAKING DOWN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR SOUTH KOREA, BUT ALSO AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POLICIES

TOWARD SOUTH KOREA. HABIB WAS GLAD TO SEE THAT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES APPEAR GENERALLY TO RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREA'S OBJECTIVES AND THAT THEY OPPOSE THE UNFRIENDLY RESOLUTION ON KOREA AND SUPPORT THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A COHESIVE WESTERN EFFORT IN THIS REGARD BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE A REAL PROSPECT OF SERIOUS TROUBLE IN EAST ASIA IF US SUPPORT FOR SOUTH KOREA WAS WITHDRAWN, IF SOUTH KOREA WERE WEAKENED INTERNALLY, OR IF SOUTH KOREA WAS CUT OFF FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.

23. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) ASKED HABIB TO COMMENT ON A) THE DISSOLUTION OF SEATO AND HIS OBSERVATION THAT THE US STILL RETAINS A COMMITMENT, AND B) THE PARADOX OF CHINESE POLICY
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WHICH URGES THE WEST TO PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST THE USSR, BUT ENCOURAGES DEVELOPMENTS WHICH TEND TO UNDERMINE THE POWER OF THE WEST.

24. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT, AT THE INSISTENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SEATO WOULD DISAPPEAR OVER A TWO-YEAR PERIOD. MANILA HAS A BILATERAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THUS DOES NOT DEPEND ON SEATO. THAILAND DID NOT HAVE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND HAD WITHER WANTED SEATO RETAINED OR, AT A MINIMUM, THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE MANILA PACT REMAIN VALID. ACCORDINGLY, THE PROVISIONS OF THE MANILA TREATY AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE RUSH-THANAT EXCHANGE, WHICH FURTHER DEFINES THE US-THAI RELATIONSHIP, REMAIN IN FORCE. THE US DID NOT ATTEMPT TO FORCE DECISIONS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON THE RETENTION OF SEATO, PREFERRING TO LET THE ASIANS DECIDE THE ISSUE.

25. RESPONDING TO THE QUESTION OF PRC INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD, HABIB NOTED SOME CHINESE ACTIVITY IN AFRICA, MOST RECENTLY IN ANGOLA, BUT SAID THE CHINESE DO NOT HAVE THE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL POWER TO PROJECT INTO THE THIRD WORLD. CHINA CAN BE EXPECTED, HOWEVER, TO SUPPORT CAUSES IN THIRD WORLD FORA THAT ARE INIMICAL TO SOVIET INTERESTS. MOREOVER, THE CHINESE WILL INSIST THAT THEY ARE PART OF THE THIRD WORLD, THOUGH MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WOULD QUESTION THAT ASSERTION. GENERALLY SPEAKING, CHINA CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BE VERY ACTIVE OUTSIDE OF ITS OWN BOUNDARIES EXCEPT WHERE SOVIET INTERESTS ARE CONCERNED. THE USSR IS THE "BE-ALL, END-ALL OF CHINESE ENMITY" AND PEKING CAN THUS BE COUNTED UPON TO ATTEMPT TO FRUSTRATE THE SOVIETS WHEREVER AND WHENEVER THEY CAN.

26 FRG PERMREP KRAP THANKED HABIB FOR HIS ILLUMINATING AND CONCISE PRESENTATION. HE AGREED THAT KOREA IS POTENTIALLY THE MOST DANGEROUS AREA IN THE FAR EAST. RECALLING HIS OWN EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN JAPAN, KRAPF NOTED THAT THE JAPANESE HAD NEVER FELT PARTICULARLY THREATENED BY CHINA OR

THE SOVIET UNION, BUT FEARED INVOLVEMENT IN A POSSIBLE KOREAN CONFLICT. JAPAN THUS IS WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE UNWISE INITIATIVES TAKEN BY THE SOUTH KOREANS ACTING ON THE PREMISE THAT THEY ARE MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO THE NORTH KOREANS.
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KRAPF NOTED THAT THE US SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE SLOW PACE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE BUILDUP. DOES THAT PACE CARRY WITH IT THE INFERENCE THAT JAPAN NO LONGER FEELS A STRONG DEFENSE NECESSARY BECAUSE IT SEES LESS RISK OF A NEW KOREAN CONFLICT?

27. HABIB REPLIED THAT JAPAN SAW KOREAN DEFENSE AS PRIMARILY A US RESPONSIBILITY. WHILE REALIZING THAT KOREAN SECURITY IS IMPORTANT TO THEIR OWN, THE JAPANESE BELIEVE THE US WILL DEFEND SOUTH KOREA. ALTHOUGH JAPAN CAN DO NOTHING MILITARILY IN KOREA, IT CAN PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, JAPAN AGREES WITH THE US THAT THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF KOREAN HOSTILITIES. THE JAPANESE FULLY APPRECIATE, HOWEVER, THE MEANING OF THE LINE DIVIDING THE TWO KOREAS AND THE FACT THAT THERE ARE ONE MILLION MEN UNDER ARMS FACING EACH OTHER ACROSS THAT LINE WITH INCREASINGLY MORE MODERN WEAPONS. MOREOVER, THE JAPANESE RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREA AS PERHAPS THE MOST PUGNACIOUS COMMUNIST POWER -- ONE THAT MAY BE EVEN MORE ISOLATED THAN ALBANIA -- WHERE THE CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS CARRIED TO THE EXTREME AND WHERE IRRATIONAL ACTS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. JAPAN CLEARLY HOPES THAT THE KOREAN PROBLEM CAN BE ACCOMMODATED AND PERMANENTLY DEFUSED OVER TIME. IN THE MEANTIME, TOKYO WARNS THE US ABOUT THE KOREAN SITUATION AND URGES THAT US FORCES NOT BE REDUCED. A FURTHER RESTRAINING FACTOR IS THE FACT THAT NORTH KOREA KNOWS THAT IT COULD NOT EARLY ATTACK THE SOUTH.

28. AMBASSADOR KRAPF NOTED JAPAN'S AWARENESS THAT WHILE IT COULD NOT SEND TROOPS TO KOREA, IT COULD BECOME INVOLVED IN A KOREAN CONFLICT THROUGH US USE OF ITS BASES IN JAPAN. HABIB REPLIED THAT JAPAN HAD GUARANTEED CONTINUED US USE OF ITS JAPANESE BASES AND FULLY RECOGNIZES THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO FIGHT IN KOREA WITHOUT BASES IN JAPAN.

29. CANADIAN PERMREP MENZIES WELCOMED THE FAR EASTERN CONSULTATION AS USEFUL AND TIMELY. HE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB AND EXPERTS FROM OTHER ALLIED CAPITALS, AND EXPRESSED REGRET THAT A CANADIAN EXPERT COULD NOT BE PRESENT. REFERRING TO CANADA'S (AND THEREFORE TO NATO'S) 2400-MILE FRONTIER ON THE PACIFIC, MENZIES NOTED ACTIVE CANADIAN INTEREST
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IN PACIFIC DEVELOPMENTS EVEN THOUGH CANADA CAN TAKE SHELTER

BEHIND THE UNITED STATES' PACIFIC DEFENSE EFFORT. CANADA'S
ROLE IN THE AREA HAD BEEN LIMITED TO PEACEKEEPING BOTH IN KOREA
AND, WITH A SOMEWHAT LESS SALUTARY RESULT, IN VIETNAM.
CANADA APPRECIATED US EFFORTS IN THE PACIFIC, THOUGH SOMETIMES
IN THE PAST OTTAWA THOUGHT THE US WAS OVEREXTENDED IN THE AREA
AND PERHAPS OVERLY HOSTILE TO THE PRC. ALTOGETHER, THE GOC FOUND
RECENT POST-VIETNAM ADJUSTMENTS IN US ASIAN POLICY MUCH MORE
PALATABLE AND SATISFACTORY. CANADA NOW AGREED WITH US ASIAN
POLICY.

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NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AF-06

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS (BY POUCH)

USNMR SHAPE (BY POUCH)

USCINCEUR (BY POUCH)

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30. MENZIES CHARACTERIZED THE THEME OF THE NAC CONSULTATION
AS THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY IN THE PACIFIC AREA. MANY NATO
COUNTRIES HAVE INTERESTS IN ASIA -- AN AREA WHICH PRESENTLY
HAS NO REGIONAL IDENTITY, AND WHERE SOME POWER MAY TRY TO
EXPLOIT THE POST-VIETNAM SITUATION DESPITE US ASSURANCES OF
CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS IN THE AREA.
WHILE IT APPEARED THAT THE ASIAN MAINLAND HAS NO RESOURCES
IN WHICH NATO COUNTRIES HAD A DIRECT INTEREST, THIS WAS NOT
TRUE IN THE CASE OF INSULAR ASIA WITH THE OIL AND MINERAL
RESOURCES OF INDONESIA, THE MINERAL WEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AND THE ENORMOUS MINERAL DEPOSITS OF AUSTRALIA AND PAPUA-NEW
GUINEA. THE ALLIES MIGHT APPROPRIATELY ASK THEMSELVES
IF THEY ARE PAYING ENOUGH ATTENTIION TO NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE PACIFIC. NATO'S NAVAL ADVISORS TALK FREQUENTLY
ABOUT PROTECTING THE VITAL TRADE ROUTES IN THE INDIAN
AND ATLANTIC OCEANS. THEY SHOULD ALSO BE CONSCIOUS
THAT THE TRADE ROUTES SUSTAINING JAPAN WERE SIMILARLY ESSEN-
TIAL GIVEN JAPAN'S ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE AND THE REQUIREMENT
THAT IT NOT BE FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN CHINA OR THE SOVIET

UNION.

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31. RAISING A SERIES OF QUESTIONS, MENZIES ASKED FIRST IF JAPAN'S RELUCTANCE TO SUPPORT SOUTH KOREA MILITARILY MEANT THAT JAPAN MIGHT BE PREAPRED TO MAKE A NAVAL DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION, PERHAPS IN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, IN DISTANT AREAS AS FAR SOUTH AS SINGAPORE. NOTING HABIB'S STATEMENT OF US INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR, MENZIES SAID HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF A US STRATEGIC RESPONSE ON CHINA'S BEHALF WERE THE SOVIETS TO LAUNCH A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE ON CHINESE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS. MENZIES SAID HE COULD PERSONALLY UNDERSTAND US SUPPORT FOR CHINA IN SUCH A SITUATION, BUT ONLY BY MEANS SHORT OF DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION. HE COULD NOT CONCEIVE OF DIRECT US CONVENTIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A BORDER SCUFFLE ALONG THE LONG SINO-SOVIET FRONTIER. MENZIES ASKED, THEREFORE, HOW THE US MIGHT USE ITS "STRATEGIC NUCLEAR UMBRELLA" IN THE ABOVE CONTEXT. IN THE EVENT OF SINO-SOVIET HOSTILITIES, MENZIES ASSUMED THAT MOST COUNTRIES WOULD "THANK GOD" THAT THEY ARE NOT CAUGHT BETWEEN THE TWO ANTAGONISTS LIKE CANADA IS BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR.

32. MENZIES ALSO ASKED FRENCH PERMREP DE ROSE ABOUT THE MAINTANANCE OF FRENCH CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN INDOCHINA AFTER THE COMMUNIST ASSUMPTION OF POWER IN THOSE STATES. MENZIES NOTED THAT ONLY THREE COUNTRIES NOW MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA. IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW, FRENCH INFLUENCE IN INDOCHINA HAD ALWAYS BEEN STRONG AND WOULD NOT BE EASILY ERASED FROM THE AREA. HE WONDERED, THEREFORE, IF AMBASSADOR DE ROSE COULD COMMENT ON FRENCH RELATIONS WITH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM AND ON CAMBODIA. (DE ROSE DID NOT RESPOND).

33. REFERRING TO MENZIES' COMMENT ABOUT NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PACIFIC, PANSA NOTED AN OCTOBER 29 AFP REPORT THAT THE SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET WAS CURRENTLY "TWICE AS IMPORTANT" AS THE US SEVENTH FLEET.

34. CONCERNING JAPANESE "OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT", HABIB RESPONDED THAT THE BASIC JAPANESE POSTURE IS IN DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND ISLANDS. SOME YEARS AGO, THERE WAS TALK OF EXPANDING THEIR CAPABILITY, BUT THIS HAS BEEN DROPPED. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, JAPAN WILL BE DEPLOYED WITHIN THE

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IMMEDIATE AREA, I.E., WITHIN 1,000 MILES OF THE HOMELAND ISLANDS AND WITH A MAJOR EMPHASIS ON ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE.

35. CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY, HABIB REPEATED THAT GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE UNITED STATES WOULD OPPOSE ANY MOVE BY THE SOVIETS TO IMPOSE BY FORCE RPT FORCE ITS PRESENCE IN EAST ASIA. AS TO AMBASSADOR MENZIES' THEORETICAL QUESTION, HABIB COULD ONLY REPEAT THAT THE MEANS WHICH WOULD BE EMPLOYED TOWARD THIS END WOULD DEPEND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

36. SVART (DENMARK) WISHED TO CLARIFY THAT THE FAILURE OF A DANISH FAR EAST EXPERT TO BE IN ATTENDANCE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS SUGGESTING A LACK OF INTEREST IN THIS CONSULTATION OR IN THE FAR EAST. HE SAID IT WAS SIMPLY A QUESTION OF THE THINNESS OF DANISH MFA RESOURCES. AS A MEASURE OF HIS COUNTRY'S INTEREST, SVART CALLED ATTENTION TO THE VISIT WHICH FONMIN ANDERSON HAS JUST BEGUN TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THE FAR EAST. TURNING TO HIS QUESTIONS, SVART ASKED WHETHER DURING HABIB'S RECENT TRAVELS HE HAD ENCOUNTERED ANY NEW INDICATIONS OF SOVIET EFFORTS IN EAST ASIA ALONG THE LINES OF THEIR PROPOSAL FOR AN ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY PACT OR A WORLD-WIDE CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES. SECONDLY, SVART ASKED WHAT IS GOING ON IN SAIGON AT THE PRESENT TIME.

37. HABIB OBSERVED THAT AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, ALL THE ASIANS HE MET TENDED TO LOOK WITH "CONCERN" ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE HANOI REGIME. IN CONTRAST, THEY WOULD EXPRESS "FEAR" OF SOVIET POWER AND INTENTIONS. THROUGHOUT THE EAST ASIAN ARCH, THIS PHENOMENON OF PREJUDICE, WELL-BASED IN HISTORY OF COURSE, SEEMED TO PREVAIL. CONCERNING SAIGON, HABIB SAID THE UNITED STATES NEVER DOUBTED THAT HANOI RAN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ON THE BASIS OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ABLE TO PICK UP FROM VARIOUS SOURCES ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN SAIGON, THIS VIEWPOINT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. A RESTRUCTURING OF THE SOCIETY RIGHT DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL SEEMS TO BE IN PROGRESS. THERE IS NO REAL GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH INDEPENDENT OF THE HANOI STRUCTURE. IN FACT, THERE IS VERY LITTLE PRETENSE OF AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH. THE PRG, WHICH WAS NEVER ANYTHING MORE THAN A SHADOW GOVERNMENT, DOES NOT EVEN FUNCTION IN SAIGON, WHICH IS RUN BY A GENERAL. THE NUMBER ONE
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MAN IN THE SOUTH IS MR. PHAM HUNG, A MEMBER OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITBURO, AND HE CONTINUES AS NUMBER ONE JUST AS HE HAS BEEN SINCE THE '60S, WHEN HIS PREDECESSOR WAS KILLED IN A B-52 RAID. FURTHERMORE, THERE SEEMS TO BE AN INCREASE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE-TRAINED SOUTHERN CADRE RETURNING TO THE SOUTH AFTER PERIODS OF TRAINING IN NORTH VIETNAM. HABIB SAID HIS PERSONAL OPINION IS THAT REUNIFICATION WILL COME ABOUT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, EVEN BEFORE THE END OF 1976.

38. HABIB SAID THAT THUS FAR, THE MASSIVE BLOOD BATH WHICH THE UNITED STATES FEARED HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THE UNITED STATES TOOK OUT 130,000 SOUTH

VIETNAMESE WHO MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS PRIMARY TARGETS FOR VIOLENT REPRISALS. OTHERWISE, HE SAID IT SEEMS A MASSIVE RE-EDUCATION PROCESS IS UNDER WAY, WITH ORGANIZATION OF THE URBAN POPULATION INTO CELLS AND BLOCK CELLS WITH THE EFFORT GRADUALLY EXPANDING OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4365

INFO ZEN ALL NATO CAPITALS

ZEN USNMR SHAPE

ZEN USCINCEUR

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39. CATALANO (ITALY) JOINED IN EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR HABIS'S PRESENCE AND HIS BRIEFING. HE SAID ALREADY THE MORNING SESSION HAD, IN HIS VIEW, BEEN ONE OF THE BEST ALLIANCE CONULTATIONS HE COULD REMEMBER AND THAT MEETINGS OF THIS SORT OUGHT TO BE AMONG THE BEST TRADITIONS OF NATO. HE WISHED SIMPLY TO OBSERVE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION CONFIRMED WHAT HABIB HAD SAID ABOUT THE SITUATION IN SAIGON; AND HE ALSO WISHED TO ADD THAT JUST AS THE USSR MISSES NO CHANCE TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE CHINESE DANGER, SIMILARLY, CHINA DOES THE SAME ABOUT THE SOVIET DANGER.

40. DR. LAHN (FRG ASSISTANT STATE SECRETARY) NOTED THAT FEDERAL CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WAS ARRIVING IN PEKING ON THAT VERY DAY. LAHN WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT AMONG PLACES SCHMIDT WAS SCHEDULED TO VISIT ON HIS ORIGINAL PROGRAM WAS SHANGHAI. HE SAID AT THE LAST MINUTE, PEKING HAD CANCELLED THE SHANGHAI VISIT AND PROPOSED THAT SCHMIDT GO TO THE PROVINCE OF SINKIANG AND ITS CAPITAL URUMCHI, WHICH IS A CENTER FOR CHINESE NUCLEAR FACILITIES. LAHN SIMPLY WISHED TO POINT OUT THE CHANGE WAS THE IDEA OF THE HOST AND NOT THE GUEST. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT IF BY ANY WILD CHANCE THE CHINESE SHOULD SHOW SCHMIDT

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SOME NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS, THE FRG WOULD, OF COURSE, REPORT TO THE ALLIES.

41. LAHN THEN WISHED TO POSE A QUESTION CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH VIETNAM. HE WAS INTERESTED IN HABIB'S SPECULATIONS THAT "UNIFICATION" MAY BE IMPOSED IN A VERY SHORT TIME. NOTING THAT LE DUAN HAS RECENTLY BEEN TO PEKING, MOSCOW AND A NUMBER OF EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS, AND NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE PREACHING THE THEME OF UNIFICATION MORE STRONGLY THAN THE CHINESE, LAHN WONDERED IF REUNIFICATION TOOK PLACE IN THE SHORT RUN, WOULD THIS CAUSE A SUDDEN IMBALANCE IN THE EQUILIBRIUM OF WHICH HABIB HAD SPOKEN? HABIB SAID THE US HAS HEARD RECURRING REPORTS THAT PEKING PREFERS TO KEEP THE TWO VIETNAMS SEPARATE. THIS SEEMS LIKE A LOGICAL POSITION FOR PEKING TO TAKE, AND IT MAY BE THIS LOGIC RATHER THAN ANY BIAS IN FACT WHICH IS THE SOURCE OF THE SERIES OF REPORTS. HABIB SAID THAT IT MAY BE THAT A REUNIFIED VIETNAM WHICH HAS THE ABILITY TO LOOK OUTWARD WILL BE A DISTURBING INFLUENCE IN EAST ASIA. HE BELIEVES THIS PERSONALLY AND HE NOTED THAT VIETNAM'S NEIGHBORS ALSO BELIEVE THIS. BUT HE CAUTIONED THAT THIS EVENTUALITY WILL NOT COME ABOUT VERY QUICKLY. FURTHERMORE, PEKING MAY REALIZE THAT IT CANNOT PREVENT REUNIFICATION EVEN IF IT WISHED TO AND FOR THAT REASON MAY DECIDE NOT TO MAKE ANY EFFORT TO PREVENT IT.

42. A/SYG PANSAL CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION, CALLING IT "EXTREMELY GOOD", ESPECIALLY IN THAT IT INVOLVED THE ALLIES IN THESE FAR EAST QUESTIONS WHICH ARE NOT USUALLY WITHIN "OUR SPHERE", BUT WHICH ARE MATTERS RELATING TO THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE ALLIES. HE SAID THE MORNING CONSULTATION WAS IN HIS VIEW "A GOOD OMEN" FOR FUTURE REINFORCED NAC CONSULTATIONS ON REGIONAL QUESTIONS. HE COULD ONLY HOPE THAT SUCH FUTURE CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE AS PROFITABLE AS THE ONE WHICH TOOK PLACE TODAY, AND WHICH WAS VIVID EVIDENCE OF THE ALLIES PUTTING INTO PRACTICE THEIR RESOLVE WITH REGARD TO CONSULTATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN PARA 11 OF THE OTTAWA DECLARATION. PANSAL THANKED ALL THE HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS WHO HAD COME FROM CAPITALS AND ESPECIALLY AMBASSADOR HABIB, "WHO HAD COME THE LONGEST WAY".

43. PANSAL THEN SAID IN ACCORD WITH COMMON PRACTICE, HE WOULD
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PROPOSE THE NATO SPOKESMAN, ON AN IF-ASKED BASIS, TO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE: "AT TODAY'S REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSSED THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF EAST ASIA. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WERE JOINED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS AS FOLLOWS:

BELGIUM - AMBASSADOR ANDRE WENDELEN

GERMANY - DR. LOTHAR LAHN, ASSISTANT STATE SECRETARY
ITALY - MINISTER MARCELLO SALIMEI
NETHERLANDS - MR. J. ROOKMAKER, DIRECTOR OF EASTERN AFFAIRS DEPARTMEN
T
UNITED KINGDOM - MR. P.J.E. MALE, ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE
UNITED STATES - MR. PHILIP C. HABIB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

"THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON EAST ASIA IS PART OF THE CONTINUOUS
PROCESS OF ALLIED POLITICAL CONSULTATION WHICH HAS ALWAYS
BEEN PART OF NATO ACITVITIES. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROCESS
WAS CONFIRMED IN ARTICLE II OF THE OTTAWA DECLARATION IN
JUNE 1974, AND AFFIRMED ONCE MORE BY THE NATO HEADS OF
GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY MET IN BRUSSELS IN MAY 1975." THERE
WAS NO OBJECTION.
BRUCE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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